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ESSAY
THE PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM IN THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION: THE PARALLELS WITH
PRE-CIVIL WAR AMERICA
Igor Grazin*
"Asked for his prognosis for events in the Baltic republics ... which are seeking
to re-establish independence lost in 1939, [Col.) Alksnis said: 'Civil war.""
The statement itself is a revealing one. Let us hope that Colonel Victor
Alksins, then the Peoples' Deputy of the U.S.S.R. and one of the leaders of the
right wing in the Soviet parliament, is wrong. Although I cannot be sure of what
he meant, some parallels between the problems of federalism in the Soviet Union
during the late-20th century, and the United States during the mid-19th-century,
were fairly evident. It is not accidental that Jeff Trimble and Douglas Stanglin
saw the similarities between Gorbachev and Lincoln and commented that both
leaders had "to struggle to hold together a union that is split. ' ' 2 No military
similarities exist, and even the political ones are fairly vague. The problems of
federalism in general, however, and the ways of resolving these problems may
be of some intellectual interest.
Here, I have to make a confession. Although I have written several papers
on federalism in the Soviet Union, I am not very familiar with the history of
the American Civil War. It was Professor Robert Rodes, of the Notre Dame
Law School, who first pointed me towards the very existence of such similarities
and recommended that I investigate Bruce Catton's "The Coming Fury." 3 To
avoid the discussions that may arise from different evaluations of different
sources on the American Civil War, I intend to restrict my historical references
to that particular work.
Even though several astonishing parallels between particular events may be
found, the political statements and personal behavior of political leaders are the
scope of this paper. From the similarities between certain instances, I do not
want to conclude that the consequences will also be similar. It is not only my
hope that the consequences will be different and there will not be a Civil War
in the late-20th century in what was once the Soviet Union, but it is also my
firm conviction that history never repeats itself exactly and that there is a place
for free human will between the generally strong links in the chain of social
causes and results. The human will is what is able to create some new conse-
quences, and avoid old ones.
What I will examine is not the semblance of incidence but the set of problems
connected with the contradictory character of federalism which may remain in
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force until the federal structure of states exists. The very existence of parallels
which manifest themselves despite differences in time (one half of a century),
space (North America and Europe), and political regimes (democracy and total-
itarianism) serve as proof of the relative stability of such problems and the
possibility of learning how to avoid them from previous experience.
I. COMPETING SOVEREIGNTIES
Immediately after a federation is formed, the first controversy which appears
is who has the responsibility of protecting the political and legal rights of the
constituent. states that form the federation. It is not the problem of protecting
the rights of people or individuals because they are protected (if they are!) or
violated by the unitary state. It is not the problem of the sovereignty of the
federal state as a whole because its pretensions of sovereignty are, in principal,
similar to those of a unitary state. What makes a federal state different from a
unitary one is that its subdivisions possess certain rights, not as purely adminis-
trative units, but as some kind of states.
Prior to the Civil War, the controversy was not a problem for the United
States under the Articles of Confederation since Article two provided that "each
state retains its sovereignty." '4 It has ceased to be a problem after the Civil War,
since the states' sovereignty as expressed in the Tenth Amendment has not been
interpreted as anything more than a mere division of jurisdiction between the
Federal Government and the States. It was the problem, however, on the eve of
Civil War. At this time, the sovereignty of states could be interpreted as something
that Could compete with the sovereignty of federal powers. The situation in the
late U.S.S.R. was almost identical. The Soviet Union's last Constitution includes
articles that dim rather than clarify the problem.
According to article 76 "a Union Republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist
state. ' 5 Article 76 was expressly supported by article 72 which states that "each
Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R." and
implicitly supported by article 78 which provides that "[t]he territory of Union
Republic may not be altered without its consent." ' 6 Moreover, article 80 held that
"[a] Union Republic has the right to enter into relations with other states,
conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular representatives,
and have part in the mark of international organizations." 7These clauses evidently
revealed the sovereignty of a republic in the Soviet Union. In contrast, contra-
dictory clauses may also be found. For example, article 75 stated that "the
sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. extends throughout its territory," 8 and article 74
explained that "in the event of a discrepancy between a Union Republic law and
All-Union law, the law of the USSR shall prevail." 9
It may be argued that the sovereignty of the federation did not contradict
the sovereignties of republics and only complimented them when necessary. If
4. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 2.
5. KONST. SSSR (Oct. 7, 1977), in 28 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert
P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds.,(1991).
6. Id. at art. 78.
7. Id. at art. 80.
8. Id. at art. 75.
9. Id. at art. 74.
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this were the case the federal sovereignty could have extended over the entire
territory of the federation without the requirement of first expecting the devel-
opment of some new problems. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Article 73 of the Soviet Constitution, which provided for federal jurisdiction,
stated that its jurisdiction was actually limitless. The article provided that the
federal government controled the right to handle "all other matters of All-Union
importance."' 1 More importantly, article 71 provided that "the sovereign rights
of Union Republics shall be safeguarded by the USSR."" This might be correct
in the cases where third parties violated these rights. In both the United States
and in the Soviet Union, however, the problem rose from the fact that the rights
of the states or republics were violated (or were at least considered to be violated)
by the federal powers themselves. In the United States, after the War of 1812,
or at least the Mexican War of 1846, and in the Soviet Union after World War
II, one cannot trace any real threat for the states or republics other than the
threat created by the federal authorities. 2
Naturally, in the United States, one of the many constitutional conflicts was
the question of slavery in the southern states. The history of it illustrates that in
spite of all its acuteness, it was a question which could have been resolved
through traditional political compromise. For example, the Missouri Compromise
of 1820 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 illustrate compromises which,
although they did not exclude the existing tensions, restrained them at least in
the framework of "normal" political struggle.' 3
Besides that, slavery had fairly firm guarantees in the constitution itself.
Both section two of article I of Madison-Ellsworth's compromise (to count five
blacks for three whites) and section two of article IV (the fugitive slaves clause)
are examples of constitutional guarantees of slavery. Initially, the United States
Constitution did not prohibit the certain expansion of slavery. '4 Consequently,
the institution of slavery itself could not be the sole cause for the conflict of
1861 and even the election of President Lincoln could be no more than just a
motive.
The apparent reason for the constitutional conflicts in the Soviet Union is
the development of nationalism which splits the federal Soviet state into smaller
national-territorial political units. Again, this may be considered as nothing more
than a mere motive or emotional impact force rather than a real reason or cause
for the conflict.
10. The proof of "all-union importance" of every given case is a mater of legal or propagandistic
technique, no more.
11. See supra note 9.
.12. The reasons behind the constitutional conflicts were so complex that I do not have here any
chance to deal with them in detail.
13. It is necessary to accentuate a fact that is generally known but still often forgotten: the
Republican leaders of the United States in the mid-19th century were not opposed so much to slavery
itself, as to its expansion coupled with the political expansion of Southern States. Consequently, they
were not so much class-fighters against slavery, but instead men who "disliked [slavery] mainly
because they saw blacks as less than human, somehow not nice to have around." C. COLLIER AND
J.L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PMLADELPHIA 141 (1986). Lincoln himself favored, to put it in Catton's
words, to have the slave "to be deported as soon as he lost his chains" CArrON, supra note 3, at
86.
14. U.S. CONST. Art. I § 9. The expansion of slavery was not prohibited until 1808.
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What underlies these motives is the conflict created by the very idea of
federalism and the understanding of subjects' rights under the federation. The
fact is that in both cases the federation that presumably had to work in the
interests of all of its subjects actually started to work in favor of some of them
or in favor of itself.
It is neither fair nor justified to look for selfish reasons for that situation.
Objectively, however, the federal policy of taxation, land use and finances, while
favorable to the industrial North, was much less favorable to the South. Properly
understood, federalism, while even protecting Southern slavery, represented the
interests of the North. Furthermore, the anti-slavery laws which were passed by
Vermont, Massachusetts and other states and which provided freedom to the
fugitive slaves not only violated the Constitution, but were also politically hostile
to the Southern states. The federal policy which was formally intended to be the
policy for the entire Union was actually the policy for only one half of it.
The same problem was found in much more drastic measures in the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union's totalitarian and state-controlled economy was equally
destructive to all republics. Traditional Soviet federalism favored the class of
party-bureaucratic apparatus and military-industrial complex whose very existence
was totally dependent on the preservation of the Union. The system of constant
and uncompensated alienation of goods from their producers made everybody
economically dependent on the existing authorities." The dependency on federal
powers was one of the dangers for the society which wanted to protect and
preserve liberal' 6 principles and values. In this sense Milton Friedman explained
the following: "Government power must be dispersed. If government is to exercise
power, better in the county than in the state, better in the state than in
Washington." 7
Generally, these differences did not undermine the similarities of the situation.
Unlike the Soviet Constitution, the United States Constitution does not include
any direct clauses describing the sovereignty of states. Each state's adoption of
the United States Constitution proved its sovereignty. In 1854, this idea of state
sovereignty was strengthened by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Overruling the uncon-
ditional clauses of the Missouri Compromise, the Act connected acceptance of
slavery in the new territories with the popular will of their white inhabitants and
created the widely known principle of "popular sovereignty." Despite the simi-
larity between the principle which laid the foundation for United States Consti-
tution "We the People of the United States. . ..." and the principle of "popular
sovereignty," the Kansas-Nebraska Act clearly stressed the role of the popular
will in forming the state's jurisdiction of sovereignty. The words were almost the
same but the accents were different; and here it was extremely important.
II. PROTECTING THE SOVEREIGNTY
Theoretically, both the United States and the Soviet Union were based on
the will of the people. It became evident in the course of creating the United
15. It is as if the federal government in Washington, D.C. had taken away almost all the cotton
from the southern states and had given back the industrial goods for the prices determined by itself.
16. Here I refer to"liberal" in its classical meaning.
17. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDoM 3 (1982).
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States Constitution that "being based on" itself is problematic in the case of a
federation. The new federation could be based on the direct will of people, as
exercised through the nation-wide elections, or on the will that is mediated by
the interim stage of sovereign bodies of the states/republics as immediate subjects
to that federation.
Here, it is not simply a question of different compositions of the structures
of powers. In failing to clearly express this contradiction, the drafters of the
United States Constitution avoided the problem of different compositions of
structures of powers. The result was the pre-Civil War constitutional crisis. In
the Soviet Constitution the contradiction was fixed expressis verbis. Besides the
paragraphs on republican sovereignty found in the preamble of the Soviet
Constitution, it was stated that "a new historical community of people has been
formed - the Soviet people." 1 8 If this mainly propagandistic statement were true,
the federative composition of the Soviet Union could be considered merely as an
anachronism. A single political unity needs a single set of supreme political
bodies without all of the complications connected with the federal structure of
the state. The idea of a single nation of a "new historical unity," contradicts
the federative composition of a state and vice versa. The federative composition
proves that, even if there is a unified nation, this unity is far from being so
absolute that it can ignore fairly considerable regional and national-regional
differences between the different parts of a state.
If these differences were incidental and temporary, they would have ceased
to exist after a certain amount of time had passed. However, since they were
not and since they were constantly reproduced in the sphere of policy and
economics, the question of protecting the political forms of expressing these
differences remained. Moreover, since when the real composition and practice of
the federal government evidently favored unitaristic tendencies and the question
of protecting sovereign rights of the states or republics became so urgent that it
was almost impossible to solve in the existing framework of constitutional practice,
the question of the nature of a federation and of its initial stage arose.
Despite the fact that it is a fairly recent occurrence, the history of the
formation of the Soviet Union is rather vague. Because of the conditions of
severe censorship on everything that was connected with the first years of Soviet
power it is almost impossible to say to what extent the Bolsheviks enjoyed popular
support and to what extent their political interests in the unification of the parts
of former Russian empire expressed the real will of the people. 9 In contrast to
American history, there were no referendums, plebiscites or conventions in the
republics to decide the matters of further statehood and unification. Rather,
everything was decided by the republican Soviets and was based on a very
restricted class-representation without any dependence on the broader popular
will.
In spite of those instances, theoretically the Soviet Union was described,
until its very end, as the "result of the free self-determination of nations and
the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics." '2
18. Supra note 9.
19. The military resistance of Polish, Baltic and Trans-Caucasian people to such a unification
can prove the fact that at least not all of the future members of Union wanted to join it.
20. Supra note 9, at art. 70.
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From a pragmatic point of view, it is trivial that the reason for such a
unification is the fact that it serves the interests of people better than their
politically independent being. This was stated as follows in the "Declaration on
Formation of the USSR" of 1922 and in the preamble of the last Soviet
Constitution: "The unification of the Soviet Republics in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics multiplied the forces and opportunities of the peoples of the
country [in the building of socialism]. ' '21 From the point of view of our present
discussion it is similar to the United States Constitution's phrase "in order to
form a more perfect Union.'"2
The fact that a Union is created in favor of its subjects and cannot or must
not be used against the sovereign bodies is evident and trivial. Unfortunately, it
was not so in the pre-War U.S. and it was far from being so in the USSR. In
both cases the idea of "nation" or the "people" has been used to strengthen
federal powers and destroy the sovereign rights of the states.
In the recently created system of Soviet federal power, (that practically ceased
to exist as a result of the abortive coup of August 1991) it had been explicated
in the formation of the Congress of People's Deputies as the "supreme organ
of USSR state power.''23 The consequence of investing the supreme power in a
unicameral body based on proportional representation created the tremendous
under-representation of republican interests. The figures for the Congress of
People's Deputies were as follows: a total of 2250 deputies composed the Congress
of People's Deputies. More than 50 per cent of these deputies came from Russia
and the Ukraine.24
Congress' right to overrule the bicameral Supreme Soviet or even the simple
possibility of entirely avoiding the Supreme Soviet at all by putting the draft for
the Congress directly served as a means to annihilate the theoretical rights of the
eleven republics. 25
By different means and methods the same result was achieved in the United
States and the Soviet Union. This was under-representation and under-protection
of certain republic's or state's rights in the federal composition of power. The
question arose of whether the sovereignty of constituent parts ceased to exist
21. Supra note 9.
22. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
23. Supra note 9, at art. 108, as amended.
24. Specifically, 1099 deputies were from Russia and 262 from the Ukraine. Together they total
1361 Deputies. Russia, Ukraine plus votes of 108 deputies of Uzbekistan and 95 votes from
Kazakhistan) - meant that four major republics had 1568 votes, whereas two thirds of a majority
from 2250 is composed of 1475 votes. DAwN MANN, ROBERT MoNYA, AND EIZABETH TEAGuE, THE
SuPREmE SoviET: A BioOAPmciA DIRECTORY, 25 (1989).
Here it is necessary to mention that these proportions do not reveal any political consequences
because the political parties in the USSR were not identical with the republican divisions. (It is similar
to the case of Democratic Party that was also split into pro-Northern and pro-Southern groups.) But
this is not our point here. What I wanted to point out here is that the federal composition of the
Soviet Union was not taken into account by the composition of its supreme organ. And this induced
problems.
25. In December 1989 together with deputy from Lithuania Egidijus Bickauskas we introduced
a clause demanding the preliminary adoption of a bill by the Supreme Soviet before it can be put
for the vote of Congress (art. 133 of Standing Order of the Congress... ) but our amendment was
watered down by the clause "as a rule" and simply ignored in the most crucial case - the adoption
of law on constitutional supervision in the USSR.
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after it joined the Union and if it did not, who was responsible for protecting
those rights if they were violated?
The Soviet Constitution provided a clear answer. Article 81 stated that "[t] he
sovereign rights of Union Republics shall be safeguarded by the USSR."' '
Something similar may be found in section 3, Art. IV of the United States
Constitution. The obligation of the federal government was even more clearly
expressed by Robert Toombs in a lecture in which he explained that the federal
government "is bound to protect and maintain it [slavery] in the States where it
[slavery] exists, and wherever its flag floats, and its jurisdiction is paramount. 27
The problem here is that the violated sovereign rights are protected by the
same party who violates them. It contradicts the classic principle: nemo debet
esse judex in propria causa - nobody can be a judge in his own case. Whatever
the different interests of the constituent parties of a federation may be, this is
not a case of these constituent parties but, a case of constituent parties and the
federation.
In his description of federalism, Stephen Kux points out "the existence of
mechanisms for resolving constitutional conflicts." 21 The problem in reality arose
from the fact that, although such mechanisms existed, they really did not provide
protection for the rights of sovereign constituent states.
Since the federal mechanisms did not provide the necessary protection, what
were the possibilities of a federation's subject to protect itself against the
federation if the federation had usurped the sovereignty of its constituent states/
republics?
I. THE OPTIONS OF SETTLEMENT
The first bona fide option - that of negotiation and subjection to some form
of arbitration is evident. I refer here to the arbitration that constitutes the missing
third party, the judge, in the instance of a case involving federation v. constituent.
However, after obtaining power which is much stronger than that of the con-
stituents, the federal authority does not lean towards such a solution.
There is no need here to recall all the efforts made by the moderate
representatives of the North and South to find political solutions acceptable for
both sides in the mid-19th century American conflict. Their efforts were aimed
towards the wrong goal. The goal was to settle the problems between the North
and South rather than the problems between the South and the Federation. The
conflicts between the North and the South (and, for instance, between Russia
and Lithuania, Yeltsin and Landsbergis) could have been mediated. Those between
Federation and States were irreconcilable. The memorandum presented by the
commissioners from South Carolina to President Buchanan aimed at "the con-
tinuance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth [South Carolina] and
the Government in Washington" was considered by a relatively moderate ad-
dressee to be a document "of the most extravagant character" that "was not
being thought of." 29 The potential power, political, economic, or military, of the
26. Supra note 9.
27. 1 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL Vww OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES
40 (1868).
28. STEPHEN Kux, SOVIET FEDERALISM: A ComPARATivE PERSPECTIVE 7 (1990).
29. CATION, supra note 3, at 163-164.
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federal government and the corresponding political ambitions were so much
greater than that of the constituents that a solution based upon equality became
improbable. The result in the United States is described by Bruce Catton in the
following words:
All of the Confederate government's attempts to establish friendly relations with
the United States, and to settle points at issue "upon principles of rights, justice,
equity and good faith" had been rebuffed; the government at Washington refused
to talk about these things, refused even to listen, and was now mustering troops
"to overawe, oppress and finally subjugate" the Southern people.3
Even the moderate stance of "neutrality" taken by Maryland 3' was not
accepted by the Federal powers because it implied the recognition of sovereign
rights to the secessionist South as well.
The similarity between the United States and the Soviet Union is evident.
Not to mention the previous proposals of Baltic deputies in the federal legislature,
among the first documents adopted by the Lithuanian parliament was the official
proposal for the Soviet Union to start negotiations "to settle all the problems
connected with the restoration of the independence of Lithuania" on the basis
of "good political and economic relations with the USSR." In response, the
answer given by Gorbachev the next day was as follows: "I think there can be
no negotiations; we negotiate only with the foreign states.' '32 Until August 1991,
the federal acts had always referred to Lithuania as the "S.S.R.," (i.e. still a
member of the Soviet Union). The further steps taken by the federal government
( an economic blockade, the use of Soviet special troops, etc.) represented punitive
acts against the rebels rather than the actions against a sovereign state.
The federal-constituent, rather than the inter-republican nature of the con-
flict, was stressed when the presidents of the Baltic states and Russia signed a
joint statement, the Jurmala Statement on July 27, 1990, and when the President
of Russia made an official visit to Tallinn immediately following the Lithuanian
massacre of January, 1991. The solidarity was further expressed when Leningrad,
(now St. Petersburg) and the second largest city of Russia, sent an official
delegation to the Baltic states.
In a situation where a federal power dominates over the constituent state,
only one stand remains for the state. It is the stand of legal arguments and the
reference to the only available legal option - the right to secede if all the other
possibilities have been exhausted. As Stephens put it, the position of United
States government on this question under President Buchanan was "strange
enough," it "held that the Federal Government had no power to coerce a
seceding state to remain in the Union" but at the same time [it] held that no
State "could rightfully withdraw from the Union. '3 3 The argument for the latter
is not extremely evident; however, Buchanan's entire position was not only
innocently "strange," but also politically dangerous. The recognition of the act
of secession could open the doors to novel, natural, and peaceful integration.
30. Id. at 364.
31. Id. at 356.
32. The Record of the 3rd Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, vol. 3, at 4 (1990).
33. 2 SEPsNS, supra note 27, at 34.
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Ignoring those problems actually meant only the continuous escalation of the
crisis. Mere denial of massive separatism does not annihilate it.
IV. THE RIGHT TO SECEDE
Until the scope of a federal government's jurisdiction is unequivocally settled,
the federal composition of a state is more than a legal-technical rudiment or
historical anachronism, (i.e. if they are not, to use Kux's words - "unitary federal
states' ").34 Furthermore, the real federation remains a political problem, and the
right to secede exists independently of its being explicitly stated (as in art. 72
Const. USSR). This may be concluded from the derivative nature of a federation
itself. As Alexander Stephens, the Vice-President of the Confederacy stated:
The Federal Government itself possesses no Right, and is intrusted [sic] with the
exercise of no Power, except by delegation from the Sovereignty of the several
States. Sovereignty itself, as we have seen, is, from its very nature, indivisible!
There never was a greater truth, more pointedly uttered than by Mr. Jefferson,
that the States of this Union "are not united upon the principle of unlimited
submission to their General Government.1 35
Paradoxically, no one in the Soviet Union who had represented federal
interests had ever denied the voluntary character of the Union itself. Even if we
ignore the violent unification of some republics into the Soviet Union (Georgia,
Moldavia, and the Baltic states), the argument derived from the voluntary
character of that union still remained. It meant that the sovereign rights of
republics did not cease to exist after they became members of the Union. Even
if they did not exercise their sovereignty to the fullest extent, they still possessed
the specific legal status at least as potential sovereigns, and had the right to
withdraw all their jurisdiction from the Union. This initial sovereignty was
recognized fully in the treaty between the American Colonies and Great Britain
signed September 3, 1783. In the treaty, the British Crown transferred its legal
sovereignty to all of the colonies, each of which was named and recognized as
a "free, sovereign and independent state.' '36
The constituents' stand against federalism is primarily legal in that they
initiate political discussion and insist on negotiations using mainly legal arguments
derived from the nature of the federal composition of the state. It goes without
saying that these arguments favor constituents rather than the centralistic federal
powers which correspondingly tend to choose non-legalistic forms of settlement.
As Zbigniew Brzezinski correctly stated, "Quite unintentionally, Gorbachev's
emphasis on greater legality - so necessary for the revival of the Soviet economy
- gave the non-Russians a powerful weapon for contesting Moscow's control over
their destiny." 37
34. Kux, supra note 28, at 8.
35. 2 STEPHENS, supra note 27, at 668.
36. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1987, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art.l, in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 151,152 (Hunter Miller, ed.)(1930).
37. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Post-Communist Nationalism, 68 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 7 Winter 1989.
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The same was the case in mid-19th century America. Confederate government
in America was:
far from engaging in revolution, it was taking the most ancient rules and
giving them a literal interpretation, and everything that it did would be done in
the strictest observance of those rules. Its very existence was justified by the
belief that the states which composed it had a legal and moral right to do what
they had done. It was this government's first article of faith that it was completely
and eternally Constitutional. .... 3.
The stand of Baltic states was the same. Adopting the Declaration of
Sovereignty on Nov. 16, 1988 the Supreme Soviet of Estonia did nothing more
than restate article 76 of the Soviet Constitution and derive the inevitable
consequences of that statement. But because of the self-contradictory character
of the Soviet Constitution, some of the developments of this statement created
direct contradictions with other articles of the same Constitution.3 9
For the first time in Soviet history, the declaration restored the definition
of sovereignty under Soviet law. Until November of 1988, no definition existed.
Sovereignty was defined as "the supreme power over given territory' '4" which
also meant that a republic's laws are superior to federal laws. The opposite
statement would contradict the idea of sovereignty itself. The sovereignty that
has only the right to create the inferior laws ceases to be the supreme power,
i.e. to be sovereignty at all. This contradicted article 74 of the Soviet Union's
Constitution.
The same contradiction also appeared in the American case. It is irrelevant
that sovereignty in its proper sense was not mentioned in the federal Constitution
itself, it was assumed at least by some of the States and this assumption
contradicted the "supremacy clause" of the U.S. Constitution. The question of
rightful "claims of ... any particular State" (sec. 3, Art. IV, U.S. Const.)
included the same problem of which claims were to be considered legal and
constitutional.
V. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The contradictory nature of federalism reflected in the Constitution gives
the opposing parties the possibility to refer to the different constitutional clauses
and articles. However, because of a federation's supposedly stronger political,
economic and military stand, the latter tends to ignore this level of opposition.
To represent the entire population, the federal power itself is rather inclined to
give up constitutionality than to be bound by constitutional, legal procedure.
In the Maryland case, the federal government had choked off secession by
sending in troops, by suspending civil rights, and by standing ready to imprison
the state legislature if necessary. In Missouri it made war on the troops of a
state which had not seceded and had driven the legal governor off in desperate
flight."
38. CATTON. supra note 3, at 390.
39. See, Igor Grazin, Constitutional Development of Estonia, 65 NonE DAmE L. REV. 141, 164(1990).
40. Compare Stephen's "[Sjovereignty itself ... is, from, its very nature, indivisible.", 2
STEPHENS, supra note 3, at 668.
41. CATTON, supra note 3, at 415.
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In Maryland one of the principal clauses of the United States Constitution,
habeas corpus, was violated. Replace Maryland with Lithuania and you'll get the
Soviet case. In the Soviet Union, the independent military commission that
investigated the events in Lithuania in January, 1991 managed to prove that it
was an attempt of a coup d'etat, a military overthrow of lawful government that
was coordinated by the highest authorities of the Soviet Union. Strangely enough,
at least one scholar in the United States praised this action by the following
statement: "We must not equate democracy with the avoidance of force to
preserve the [Soviet] Union. Lincoln used force. 4 2
Fortunately, the position of Brzezinski, another scholar and outstanding
politician, is more rationally grounded. He stated that a "[m]assive national
repression in the Soviet Union would affect adversely the process of democrati-
zation is Eastern Europe, but also arouse stronger nationalist passions within the
region.'"4 3
In the course of the American Civil War, both the spirit and the letter of
the Constitution was violated. President Lincoln's "Emancipation Proclamation"
of Jan. 1, 1863 was in direct contradiction with the section 2, article IV of the
United States Constitution. Those violations became possible not because of the
legal strength of the arguments behind the violations but because of the political
and military possibility to protect them."
Extra-constitutional measures to solve the federalist conflicts had also been
used by the USSR. Massive use of military force was given in January, 1990 just
a year before the bloody events in Latvia and Lithuania, in the capital of
Azerbaijan, Baku. Using as a pretext some former inter-ethnic conflict, the Soviet
Union introduced martial law on January 20, 1990 and hundreds of people were
killed and tens of political leaders were arrested. 4 It was aimed at interrupting
the forthcoming elections to the republican parliament where it was probable
that the vast majority of seats would have been gained by the non-Communist
popular movement. A similar type of extra-constitutional action is also, to some
extent, similar in the United States. Just as the United States federal government
introduced a naval blockade against the Confederate States during the course of
42. Jerry Hough, SOVIET DICTATORS AND DEMOCRATS, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1991 at Cl. This
analysis must not be taken too seriously. It is based on a lack of factual evidence. The claim about
the economic reforms simply ignores the fact that there have been no economic reforms under
Gorbachev whatsoever. Hough's primary position of real democracy for some and Communist unitary
state for others is extremely suspicious from an ethical point of view.
43. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 37, at 3.
44. This contradiction was later abolished by the thirteenth amendment as one of the legal
consequences of the Civil War.
45. The Moscow special envoy sent to Baku Jevgeny Primakov (later - Gorbachev's envoy to
Saddam Hussein in February, 1991) confessed that the military action was inspired not by the non-
existing civil disturbances but to avoid the secession of Azerbaijan that must be canceled at any
costs." Materially k tragedj v Baku [Material Regarding the Tragedy at Baku), 1990 at 28 (materials
published for the Supreme Soviet by Azerbaijani Deputies).
The casualties of that action ordered by the federal authorities amounted to 160 people killed
by soldiers, at least 140 squashed by tanks and armored vehicles, and more than 400 people wounded.
The independent military commission that investigated the events in Lithuania in January 1991
wrote in its conclusion: "The USSR President cannot claim ignorance of the planned joint actions
by the Soviet Armed forces, internal troops... Such actions could not be carried out without his
personal permission." Committee Report, The Shield, Feb. 11, 1991, at 1.
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war, the Soviet Union did the same against Lithuania in April 1990 without any
sort of recognition of that republic as an international legal entity.4'
It may be said that the federal government is the last one who is ready to
recognize the sovereign rights of constituent states and if the states did not
succeed to involve the federal government in the process of legal arbitration, the
federal power has the extra-legal means to preserve its own interests.
VI. FEDERAL PROPERTY ON CONSTITUENT TERRITORIES
In both cases, the primary means to achieve federal goals against secessionist
policy was the federal property located in the constituent territories and under
the control of the federal government. Federal forts in the United States territorial
waters and the events at Fort Sumter during 1861 reveal all the political and
legal backgrounds of the problem. Theoretically, as the means in the hands of
Federal Government the U.S. forts constituted the joint property of all the states
which had to be managed in their common interests. At the same time they were
located on the territories of the states, (i.e. finally they were under the jurisdiction
of state's sovereignty), especially in the case when they could be used against
such a sovereignty. Speaking about the case of Fort Sumter, Alexander Stephens
stated:
The-title, therefore, of the United States to the land on which Fort Sumter was
built, was in no essential respect different from the title of any other land-holder
in the State. The tenure by which the United States claimed and held this
property, differed in no essential respect from the tenure by which every other
land-owner held similar property in the State; nor was this property of the United
States, so purchased and held under grant from South Carolina, any less subject
to the right of Eminent Domain on the part of the State, than any other lands
lying within her limits. If this was so even before Secession, (and no one can
successfully assail the position), then how much more clearly this right (by virtue
of the principle of Eminent domain), to demand the possession of this property
for public use, for her own protection, appears after she had expressly resumed
the exercise of all of her Sovereign powers? This right to demand the possession
of this Fort, therefore, being unquestionably perfect in her as a Sovereign State
after Secession, whether it was before or not, she had transferred to the Con-
federate States. Hence, their right to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter, was
perfect, viewed either morally, or politically."
The federal mechanism of a federal state provides the means to express the
political will that is given to a constituent state. In the United States, it has been
the equal representation of states in the U.S. Senate and the exhaustive list of
federal jurisdiction in Article I of the U.S. Constitution. It is much more than
had been given to republics in the Soviet Constitution where the Congress of
People's Deputies was based mainly on proportional representation; its jurisdiction
is discretionary; and the Chamber of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet did not
46. In the case of confederate states, Lord Russel, the British Foreign Minister, made a hint
that they can probably be recognized at least as a belligerent party. But in this case, it is not evident
in whose favor this recognition was given. The recognition of United and Confederate states as
belligerent made the naval blockade internationally valid too.
47. 2 STEPHENS, supra note 27, at 42.
[Vol. 18:69
Federalism in the Former Soviet Union
hold the specific powers invested in the U.S. Senate. Even these means proved
not to be enough to protect the sovereign rights of the States when they were
considered violated (or were considered to be potentially violated) by the federal
power. The problem which arises here is what can a constituent state do, if its
voice in the federal assembly is too weak to be heard and the assembly still
passes the law that evidently violates the rights of this particular state. To whom
does the last word belong now?
It may be assumed that none of the constituent states have ever joined any
union with the intention of damaging its own interests. If the fact of joining the
union becomes evidently harmful the constituent state obtains the right to "call
back" its sovereign rights and restore its sovereignty over the territory that is
covered by its legal title. It is also in the "course of human events" when it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political "bands which have
connected them with another." In this sense, the joint property of all the members
of a federation is not based on the absolute equality of all proprietors. Rather,
it is based on a privileged position of one of them - the privileged sovereign of
this territory. If the state does not have any other privileges, it at least has the
privilege to secede and to take its territory with it.
The problem of "giving up" the federal property that may form the material
foundation for the restored sovereignty of the constituent states also appeared in
the Soviet Union. It is enough to mention the tragic events in Latvia and
Lithuania which were initiated by the special federal troops seizing the Publishing
House in Riga and the television tower in Vilnius.48 This was an extreme case.
However, another Soviet "Fort Sumter" happened more quietly, and its conse-
quences were to some extent similar to the original one. On November 27, 1989,
the Supreme Soviet passed, by a narrow margin, a law that had to provide some
kind of economic self-management for the three Baltic States. Besides other
clauses, the law provided some possibilities for the transformation of federal
property under the authority of those republics. The adoption of the law did not
induce any motions from the federal part until the time came to carry out these
transformations. Then the Deputy Prime-Minister of the Soviet Union issued the
order (No. 1045P, July 2, 1990) to integrate all the enterprises that were
transferred to the republics into a new federally owned concern which would pay
the tax revenues directly into the federal budget. The result was almost identical
as the result in Fort Sumter; all possibilities for negotiations were canceled. The
subsequent events amounted to economic war and intense political confrontation.
VII. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
The determined territory is perhaps the most important legal precondition
48. In the Vilnius case this statement was not correct: Television communication facilities were
managed by the Ministry of Communications that were not a federal, but "federal-republican"
facilities. So it could be with the republican authorities as well.
The Riga publishing-house case was more federal but also not a legally absolutely valid one.
From the formal point of view all the major publishing houses, printing equipment and even paper
belonged to the C.P.S.U. - the federal political party. So the troops that are officially under the
control of a state were used in this case to protect the property of an unitary Communist Party, i.e.
technically - private property and from a legal point of view - a civil case.
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of state sovereignty. Without a territory or with amputated territory there are no
objects over which the sovereignty can be exercised. This is one of the reasons
why the federal powers in the case of conflicts tried to destruct the territorial
structure or territorial integrity of constituent states. The efforts to create some
extra-territoriality for the federal property is just a part of the problem. To some
extent this is a matter of policy and military strategy, but it is not only that.
The considerable changes in territory create new problems of determining who is
the sovereign and to what extent. If the territorial changes are vast ones it can
be stated that the former sovereign who joined the union has ceased to exist and
the corresponding claims cannot be legally and politically validated. These efforts
have never been groundless - as the federal and secessionist claims exist in a
parallel way on the same territories (Washington D.C. excluded) the constituent
states themselves may be (and often are) split between these two political positions
that objectively favor the federal government who has the opportunity of a
nation-wide unification of its supporters.
The most typical case in the United States was the Commonwealth of Virginia
which split into two camps along geographical lines: the federalists and confed-
eralists. As Catton explains:
The federal government, now would calmly break a state in half, turning to
its own advantage a hump-backed act of secession which was even more irregular
than the original act of secession which Washington was fighting to suppress. It
was giving the war a shape - this early, with serious fighting not yet begun -
which would make a compromise peace, a settlement by negotiation, all but
impossible.-
The same action in the eastern counties of Tennessee was taken not because of
the lack of proper will but because of the inability of the federal government to
provide necessary assistance to the potential new state.
I am not competent enough to launch a discussion on the spiritual and
material foundations that caused such a political polarization in the framework
of separate states in the United States. But as far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned
I can firmly state that there are certain fairly evident political and economic
foundations for the Unionist sentiments in generally independence-minded re-
publics. The results of a totalitarian national policy with all its mass deportations,
forced and violent migrational moves, administratively commanded economy,
and tremendous disproportionality between different parts of the economy, has
created a situation where 60-80 million people, up to approximately twenty-five
percent of the population, no longer live, in their home republics. The nature of
their social position and economic activities had made them objectively dependant
on the preservation of the Soviet system. Furthermore, since there is no place
for national sentiments, their status as constant migrantg has reinforced their
"all-Union" mentality. 0 This is a group of people where the Brezhnev Consti-
tution of the U.S.S.R. has, unfortunately, been to some extent correct. These
49. CATrON, supra note 3, at 415.
50. A worker who has come to work in a defense-oriented factory that is of no use for the
republic will loose his job when the Soviet Union is dissolved. An engineer or manager whose career
has been dependent on political loyalty rather than professionalism is not needed when the C.P.S.U.
is not in power anymore, and the republican movement is anti-communist in its political essence.
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people are the "Soviet people." Although they are a minority in the republics,
these people were used as a pretext for anti-republican actions by Moscow federal
powers. Introducing special punitive forces into the Baltic states was officially
carried out "on the request" of some anonymous Salvation Committees of pro-
Union political groups which pretended to defend the interests of these people.
For a long time it had been Gorbachev's firm claim that the popular
movements in the republics do not represent the majority but are a relatively
small group of political extremists.5 Interestingly, President Lincoln made the
same mistake:
It may well be questioned whether there is, today, a majority of the legally
qualified voters of any State, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion.
There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many,
if not in every other one, of the so-called seceded states . 2
The parallel between the United States and the Soviet Union goes much
further. In his message to the 37th Congress of the U.S. (July 5, 1861) dealing
with the political split in Virginia, Lincoln declared that a group of "loyal
citizens" who had proclaimed themselves to be a new government in Western
Virginia had to be recognized and protected "as being Virginia.' ' The testimony
given by Col. Viktor Alksnis after the mid-January, 1991 events in Lithuania
revealed that the initial scenario of a military coup d'etat sanctioned by Moscow
included the proclamation of the supreme power to be invested in the above
mentioned Salvation Committees. This time, the idea failed as it failed later at
the national level in August.
Generally, one can conclude that the attitude of federal powers towards
alternative governments has been wanting until very recently. It has been so in
the case of the "independent Soviet" in Northeastern Estonia, the "republican
government" of South Ossetia (Georgia), and the proclamation of "Dniestr
Soviet Socialist Republic" in Moldavia. Although not formally recognized, they
nevertheless enjoyed the federal government's support.
What is more important than the political realities was the undermining of
the territorial integrity of the republics as the material foundation of their
sovereignty that was protected by article 78 of the Soviet Constitution and was
embodied in the Soviet law itself. On April 3, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the
Soviet Union adopted the law on secession. Without discussing any other pro-
visions of the law, it is important to mention one clause of the law. Section 2,
article 3 provided the following:
In a Union republic whose territory includes areas with concentration of national
groups that make up the majority of the population in a given locality, the
results of the voting in these localities shall be considered separately during the
determination of the referendum results.
Although it was vague in its content, the statement clearly expressed the
possible consequences. It could lead to the violation of territorial integrity of a
51. The more than three quarters support for independence given on referendums of Baltic
States in February through March of 1991 is the adequate proof just the opposite claim.
52. CATTON, supra note 3, at 422.
53. Id. at 420.
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The Lincolnian way of handling the problem, (to have Virginia simply divided,
though even it was unconstitutional), would be perhaps the most favorable for
a republic in the Soviet Union's case." But the law by its intended vagueness
did not exclude the other option which is to have the vote on an "area with
concentration of national groups ... " as equal to that of other territorial units
of a republic.
From what has been already discussed, it becomes evident that the contro-
versies imminent to the federative structure of the state may create, under certain
circumstances, a fairly tense political situation that may result in considerably
violent actions. Looking back at the eve of the American Civil War I do not
want to state that the military outcome of these events was inevitability fatal.
However, comparing the events in another country which has a principally
different political regime, political culture, and values, one has still to conclude
that the federal power is not very anxious to respect the rights of constituent
states and that the lack of a proper mechanism of peaceful arbitration of disputes
between the federation and its constituents may give rise to fairly dangerous
political collisions.
In my opinion Alexander Stephens exaggerated when he equaled federalism
("centralism") and despotism, and when he stated that "there is no difference
between Consolidation and Empire. 56 There is only some truth in those words.
Nevertheless, if there is no proper way to check on the federal powers, (especially
if this federal power at the same time executes the totalitarian regime as has
been the case in the Soviet Union), the government evidently tends towards strict
centralism, violating the rights of its constituents. The federal powers, unfortu-
nately, are inclined to forget the conditions on which the federation was formed
and to identify its own interests with the all-national interests. Although this may
be tolerated for a fairly long period of time, the situation itself includes the
possibility of a political crisis.
The current trends in the world, particularly in Europe and the post-Civil
War history of the U.S.A. have proved the political, spiritual and economic
advantages of integration. All of the possible legal claims against the United
States' federal government of the mid-1860's are nullified by the further progress
of this country. The United States is the best proof of who was right at that
time. The creation of a new European Community is proof of the fact that the
proper integration favorable to all is possible only if based on real voluntariness
and real respect for the economic and political rights and interests of all people
involved in that process. Only under these conditions will the advantages of
integration, confederalism and federalism prove their validity. Alternatively,
preservation of any union through mere force in any form will create waste and
unnecessary expenditures.
54. I'd like to remind the governmental spokesman in the U.S.S.R., who by referring at the
Final Act of C.S.C.E. (Helsinki, 1975), took an oath of loyalty to the principle of inviolability of
post-World War II frontiers in Europe keeping in mind the integrity of the Soviet Union and excluding
the problem of integrity of occupied Baltic States.
55. But even this "favorable" solution was unacceptable for the Baltic states whose legal claims
were based on the legal continuity of their sovereignty which had to cover their territorial boundaries
too. The undermining of the territorial integrity of Estonia, for example, was executed by the federal
act of the Soviet Union that transferred part of Estonian territory to Russia in 1944.
56. 2 STEPHENs, supra note 27, at 668-69.
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The only real justification for the preservation of the Soviet Union was to
create a more effective economic system and a system which better protects
human liberties. As the People's Deputy of the U.S.S.R., economist Mikhail
Bronstein had repeatedly said, the common market can be the only justification
for the existence of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, this had not been the case.
By rejecting any kind of economic reform, and by strengthening the system of
authoritarian and administrative power, the federal authorities in the Soviet
Union managed only to sharpen their political conflict with the republics. The
outcome of this deepening political and economic confrontation was hardly
predictable. And though the defeat of the communist junta in August 1991
automatically solved some of these problems, many still remain. One can only
hope for the best and rely upon the ability of politicians to acquire lessons from
past experience, including the experience of pre-Civil War America.

